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 use suWe consider whether hospitals that receive higher payments from
Medicare improve patient outcomes, using exogenous variation in am-
bulancecompanyassignment amongpatientswho livenear oneanother.
Using Medicare data from 2002–10 on assignment across ambulance
companies and New York State data from 2000–6 on assignment across
area boundaries, we find that patients who are brought to higher-cost
hospitals achieve better outcomes. Our estimates imply that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in Medicare reimbursement leads to a 4 per-
centage point ðor 10 percentÞ reduction in mortality; the implied cost
per at least 1 year of life saved is approximately $80,000.I. Introduction
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measuring returns to hospital care 171Medicare: the public health insurance program for those over the age
of 65 and the disabled ðHartman et al. 2013Þ. Within the United States,
Medicare spending varies widely across hospitals, and a natural question
is whether hospitals that provide more care and accrue higher Medi-
care spending levels actually achieve better health outcomes or whether
the additional spending at high-cost hospitals is largely unnecessary be-
cause of moral hazard concerns ðBaicker, Chandra, and Skinner 2012Þ.
A main problem when estimating performance differences across
hospitals is patient selection. Patients choose or are referred to hospitals
on the basis of the hospital’s capabilities: the highest-quality hospital in
an area may treat the sickest patients. Alternatively, higher-educated or
higher-income patients may be in better health andmore likely to choose
what is perceived to be a higher-quality hospital. Indeed, efforts to provide
“report cards” for hospitals are often criticized for their inability to fully
control for differences in patients across hospitals ðRyan et al. 2012Þ.
This paper develops an empirical framework that allows us to compare
hospital performance using plausibly exogenous variation in hospital
assignment. The key ingredient of our approach is the recognition that
the locus of treatment for emergency hospitalizations is, to a large ex-
tent, determined by prehospital factors: ambulance transport decisions
and patient location. To the extent that ambulance companies are
pseudo-randomly assigned to patients in an emergency, we can develop
convincing measures of the impact of hospital differences on patient
outcomes. In particular, we study differences in Medicare spending,
which is directly related to policy and serves as a summary measure of
treatment intensity.
We consider two complementary identification strategies to exploit
variation in ambulance transports. The first uses the fact that in areas
served by multiple ambulance companies, the company dispatched to
the patient is effectively random because of rotational assignment or
even direct competition between simultaneously dispatched competi-
tors. Moreover, we demonstrate that ambulance companies serving the
same small geographic area have preferences as to which hospital they
take patients. These facts suggest that the ambulance company dis-
patched to emergency patients may serve as a random assignment mech-
anism across local hospitals. We can then exploit ambulance identifiersversations; seminar participants at the National Bureau of Economic Research, University
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Allprovided in national Medicare data to develop instruments for hospital
choice based on patient ambulance assignment. Finally, an innovation in
our approach is that we can also use these ambulance payment data to test
and control for any prehospital differences in treatment that might
independently affect outcomes.
Our second strategy considers contiguous areas on opposite sides of
ambulance service area boundaries in the state of New York. In New
York, each state-certified emergency medical service ðEMSÞ provider is
assigned to a territory via a certificate of need process in which it is al-
lowed to be “first due” for response. Other areas may be entered when
that area’s local provider is busy.We obtained the service area boundaries
for each EMS provider from the New York State Department of Emer-
gency Medical Services, and we couple these data with a unique hospi-
tal discharge data set that identifies each patient’s exact residential ad-
dress. This combination allows us to compare those living on either side
of an ambulance service area boundary. To the extent that these neigh-
bors are similar to one another, the boundary can generate exogenous
variation in the hospitals to which these patients are transported.
To carry out our primary analysis, we construct a universe of Medicare
hospital claims for patients brought to the hospital for “nondeferrable”
emergent conditions over the 2002–10 period. We begin by showing that
the observable characteristics of these patients are quite balanced across
ambulance companies that take their patients to hospitals of very differ-
ent spending levels and that these ambulance company “preferences”
are strongly associated with actual patient spending. We then show that
higher-spending hospitals achieve better patient outcomes: we estimate
that a one standard deviation increase in hospital reimbursement is as-
sociated with an 11 percent reduction in emergency patientmortality com-
pared to the mean. This finding is robust to a broad set of controls includ-
ing detailed controls for treatment in the ambulance as well as to other
robustness tests. Our findings imply that the cost to theMedicare program
of extending life by at least 1 year is approximately $80,000. These results
are found across different types of patients and across different types of
hospitals.
We then carry out a confirmatory analysis using the universe of elderly
hospital inpatient admissions in New York State over the 2000–2006
period. Despite the fact that patient characteristics are balanced across
bordering ambulance service areas with very different costs, we find that
higher-cost hospitals are associated with better patient outcomes. Our
estimates are similar to the Medicare analysis: a one standard deviation
increase in costs is associated with a 9 percent reduction in mortality
compared to the mean.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II places our project in the
context of the previous literature on measuring returns to hospital careThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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measuring returns to hospital care 173andmeasuring hospital quality, and it describes the nature of prehospital
care as it informs our approach. Section III discusses our empirical
strategy, and Section IV describes the data sources. Section V presents
the basic results fromMedicare data, and Section VI presents comparable
results from New York State. Section VII presents conclusions.II. Background
A. Medicare Spending on Hospital Care
Before estimating whether high-spending hospitals achieve better health
outcomes, it is useful to consider how some hospitals are able to bill Medi-
caremore than others. The payments to hospitals are broken into two basic
parts: a payment to the facility itself and a separate payment for physician
services.
Facility payments are largely determined by the well-studied Prospective
Payment System ðCutler 1995; Gottlober 2001Þ. Under this system, diagno-
ses and procedures performed during the hospital stay are coded by hos-
pitals using the International Classification of Diseases ðICDÞ disease and
procedure classification codes.1 An intermediary that administers the pay-
ments to hospitals fromMedicare groups these classifications into diagnos-
tic related groups ðDRGsÞ. Each DRG is assigned a weight that is associ-
ated with the level of resources associated with that DRG. This DRGweight
is then multiplied by the hospitals’ payment rate, which is categorized as
either “large urban” or “other.” These weights are further multiplied by
factors that reflect ð1Þ a wage index for the area, ð2Þ indirect medical edu-
cation costs for teaching hospitals, ð3Þ a factor that further subsidizes hos-
pitals that serve a “disproportionate share” of low-income patients, and
ð4Þ payments for patients whose costs are considered “outliers,” for which
the hospital may appeal to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices ðCMSÞ to be reimbursed.2We will compare patients who live near one1 In what follows, wemake use of ICD9-CM codes, which are based on the ninth version of
the ICD codes and are the official system of assigning codes to diagnoses and procedures
associated with hospital utilization in the United States.
2 For each DRG, the payment for hospital h is
Phd 5 Ph  ð11WageIndexhÞ  ð11 IMEhÞ  ð11DSHhÞ DRGWeight
plus any outlier payments that are reimbursed on a cost basis. The term IME stands for
indirect medical education, and DSH compensation hospitals that treat a “disproportion-
ate share” of patients who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income or Medicaid. For
example, at the start of our time period, the DRG weight for a concussion was 0.54, and
it was 19.0 for a heart transplant ðGottlober 2001Þ. The payment system is complex, with ex-
ceptions made for rural hospitals that are designated critical access hospitals; psychiatric,
cancer, long-term care, children’s, and rehabilitation hospitals; separate inflation factors
used for Hawaii and Alaska; and separate payments for heart, liver, lung, and kidney ac-
quisition costs and for hospital bad debts attributable to nonpayment of the Medicare
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Allanother, so the sources of variation in spending come from theDRG,which
is in turn a function of patient characteristics ðillness severity, comorbid-
itiesÞ and provider treatment intensity decisions ðprocedures performedÞ.
Smaller sources of variation come from the amount of medical education
and care provided to low-income patients in the particular hospital and
the extent to which there are outliers, which again is a function of pa-
tient characteristics and provider treatment intensity decisions. When one
controls for the primary diagnosis and comorbidities, much of the varia-
tion should come from treatment intensity decisions, although these could
be based on patient characteristics that are not fully captured by patient
controls.3
The second source of variation in spending for patients admitted to
the hospital comes from physician fees. These are paid on a fee-for-service
basis: the more care that is provided, the more physicians are paid by
Medicare. In efforts to reduce Medicare spending, there is hope that by
moving these payments to one thatmore closely resembles the prospective
payment system through “bundled payments,” Medicare can begin reim-
bursing hospitals for quality of care rather than volume of care ðColla et al.
2012Þ.
In summary, within health care markets, hospitals can accrue higher
Medicare spending by providing more intensive treatments through
higher physician fees, higher DRG weights, and more outlier payments.
These more intensive treatments could reflect supply- or demand-side
characteristics: provider preferences for treatment intensity on the sup-
ply side and underlying patient health on the demand side. Higher pay-
ments are also provided to teaching hospitals and hospitals that serve
low-income populations.B. Previous Literature
Our work is related to a number of cross-cutting literatures that speak
to performance differences across hospitals.
1. Hospital Spending and Health Outcomes
There is a sizable literature on spending and outcomes at the hospital
level. This literature comes to mixed conclusions about the relationshipdeductible and coinsurance ðHuang and Frank 2006Þ. These exceptions are beyond the
scope of the current paper, which relies on variation across patients who go to different
hospitals but reside in the same zip code, andwe consider paymentsmade for inpatient stays
associated with acute care.
3 One DRG includes the outcome of interest: acute myocardial infarction ðAMIÞ in
which the patient expired. These payments are slightly lower than related AMI DRGs, so a
hospital with a higher mortality rate would have lower Medicare reimbursements to the
facility, all else equal. This small source of variation would bias the results away from those
found below.
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measuring returns to hospital care 175between hospital spending and health outcomes ð Joynt and Jha 2012Þ.
Several studies find significant returns to measures of hospital treatment
intensity. Stukel et al. ð2012Þ investigate variation in spending across
hospitals in Ontario and find that higher spending due to costly inter-
ventions such as the use of specialists and more nursing care is associ-
ated with significantly lower mortality. Allison et al. ð2000Þ find that those
treated for AMI at teaching hospitals, which tend to exhibit higher treat-
ment intensity, had roughly 10 percent lower mortality than nonteach-
ing hospitals and that this effect persisted for 2 years after the incident.
Romley, Jena, and Goldman ð2011Þ document that those treated in Cali-
fornia hospitals with the highest end-of-life spending have much lower
inpatient mortality: inpatient mortality in hospitals at the highest quin-
tile of spending is 10–37 percent lower than at the lowest quintile across
a range of conditions. Skinner and Staiger ð2009Þ show that hospitals
that were early adopters of “home-run” technologies had modestly better
outcomes when they accrued higher costs, although slower adopters did
not.
Other studies suggest no returns to higher spending. Glance et al.
ð2010Þ study Nationwide Inpatient Sample ðNISÞ data from 2006 and
find that hospitals with low risk-adjusted inpatient mortality rates are
associated with lower costs. Rothberg et al. ð2010Þ use these NIS data
from 2000–2004 and find that the change in hospitals’ mortality rates
and their growth in costs are uncorrelated. A middle ground is struck by
Barnato et al. ð2010Þ, who find small positive returns to higher end-of-
life spending in terms of lower mortality but find that these effects fade
quickly and are largely gone by 180 days after admission. These results
suggest little long-term benefit to higher spending.
Studies of regions within the United States show large disparities in
spending that are not associated with improvements in health outcomes
ðFisher et al. 1994; Pilote et al. 1995; Kessler and McClellan 1996; Tu
et al. 1997; O’Connor et al. 1999; Baicker and Chandra 2004; Fuchs
2004; Stukel, Lucas, and Wennberg 2005; Sirovich et al. 2006; Cutler
et al. 2013Þ. Fisher et al. ð2003Þ studied Medicare expenditure data and
found that end-of-life spending levels are 60 percent higher in high-
spending areas compared to low-spending ones in the United States.
Nevertheless, no difference is found across regions in 5-year mortality
rates following a health event such as a heart attack or hip fracture. This
wide variation in spending and similarity of mortality rates were again
found when the sample was restricted to teaching hospitals ðFisher et al.
2004Þ. The lack of a relationship between regional variation in spending
and health outcomes has been cited in support of reducing Medicare
spending by 20–30 percent without adversely affecting health outcomes
ðFisher, Bynum, and Skinner 2009Þ. Regional spending differences in-
corporate a variety of factors above and beyond the inpatient spending
studied here; we return to this distinction in the conclusion.This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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All2. Inference Problem: Patient Selection
A major issue that arises when comparing hospitals is that they may treat
different types of patients. For example, greater treatment levels may be
chosen for populations in worse health. At the individual level, higher
spending is strongly associated with higher mortality rates, even after
risk adjustment, which is consistent with more care provided to patients
in ðunobservablyÞ worse health. At the hospital level, long-term invest-
ments in capital and labor may reflect the underlying health of the pop-
ulation as well. Differences in unobservable characteristics may therefore
bias results toward finding no effect of greater spending.
Research on area- or hospital-level variation in costs recognizes the
issue of patient selection. To address this concern, studies tend to focus
on diagnoses for which patients are likely to present with similar severity
levels ðe.g., heart attacksÞ. They note that observable patient character-
istics are similar across areas ðsee, e.g., Pilote et al. 1995; O’Connor et al.
1999; Fisher et al. 2003; Stukel et al. 2005Þ. For example, Cutler et al.
ð2013Þ find that demand-side factors do not explain regional variation
in Medicare spending, but physician beliefs about treatment efficacy do.
Further, these studies endeavor to control for patientmix with a variety of
indicators of patient severity. But even the best controls based on diag-
nosis codes and patient characteristics are only imperfect proxies for
underlying severity. Advanced risk adjustment techniques explain less
than 10 percent of the year-to-year variation in patient spending in the
Medicare program ðGarber, MaCurdy, and McClellan 1998Þ. While some
fraction of the unexplained variation is exogenous and therefore un-
predictable, it is likely that patient decisions to seek medical treatment
are driven by health factors unobservable to the researcher.
Zhang, Baicker, and Newhouse ð2010Þ, for example, find that the
unadjusted correlation between pharmaceutical spending and medical
ðnondrugÞ spending across high- and low-spending Medicare regions is
high ð.6Þ but that this finding is highly sensitive to patient controls; the
correlation falls to just .1 when patient health status is taken into ac-
count. In addition, Doyle ð2011Þ compared patients in Florida and again
found that observable characteristics were similar across areas that had
significant variation in hospital spending levels. When the analysis fo-
cused on tourists in similar destinations—a group of patients that is
arguably more comparable across areas and is unlikely to affect the
chosen level of treatment intensity in the area—higher-spending areas
were associated with substantially lower mortality.
The use of claims-based diagnoses to control for underlying healthmay
also be problematic because the diagnosis measures themselves could be
endogenous. That is, a patient listed with many diagnoses could be in
poor health or could have been treated by a provider that tends to diag-This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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Medicare patients who move to higher-intensity regions experience a
greater increase in the number of diagnoses over time compared to sim-
ilar patients in the area from which they moved. Meanwhile, Welch et al.
ð2011Þ find an inverse relationship between regional diagnostic frequency
rates and case fatality rates, suggesting that themarginal patient diagnosed
in a high–diagnosis frequency ðand high–observation intensityÞ area may
be less sick compared to patients diagnosed with the same condition in
low-frequency areas. To control for underlying health differences, another
direct measure is the patient’s lagged health care spending. Yet this too
may be problematic when the goal is to describe health care systems as
high versus low intensity, as intensity is autocorrelated. Clearly, with the
limitations of standard risk adjustment methods in mind, it is even more
critical to develop a methodology that cleanly separates provider assign-
ment from patient health.
One previous source of variation used in health economics is differ-
ential distance to the hospital as an exogenous instrument for deter-
mining hospital assignment. McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse ð1994Þ
and Cutler ð2007Þ show that patients who live closer to ðand are treated
byÞ hospitals that perform cardiac catheterization, relative to hospitals
that do not, have improved survival rates. They note that the mechanism
for this improvement is likely due to “correlated beneficial care”: su-
perior care that is not due to the invasive procedures themselves. Ge-
weke, Gowrisankaran, and Town ð2003Þ used differential distance to
study pneumonia patients in the Los Angeles area and found that large
and small hospitals had better outcomes than medium-sized ones, and,
related to the comparisons here, they found suggestive evidence that
teaching hospitals had better outcomes than nonteaching hospitals.
Chandra and Staiger ð2007Þ employ a Roy model in which physicians
specialize in more intensive treatments over medical treatments if there
are relatively high returns to doing so, and productivity spillovers further
enhance the returns to intensive treatment. In this model, the spillover
results in potentially worse outcomes for patients who would benefit
most from the less intensive treatment because the region has special-
ized in the intensive treatment to raise average outcomes. As a result,
restricting the intensive hospitals to practicing in the less intensive style
would result in worse health outcomes, despite the potential for little
difference in outcomes across areas in the cross section. Using differ-
ential distance to estimate treatment effects, their empirical results sup-
port the model’s predictions.
While differential distance has proved useful, it also faces some key
limitations. First, patients who live relatively close to “high-tech” hospi-
tals could be different from those who do not in ways that are difficult to
control. For example, wealthier and healthier areas may demand theThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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Alllatest treatments, and hospitals may locate near certain types of patients.
Indeed, Hadley and Cunningham ð2004Þ find that safety net hospitals
locate near the poorest patients. Additionally, hospitals may endoge-
nously adopt technologies if they believe that their patient population
will benefit and their patient population is primarily composed of those
who live relatively close to the hospital. Third, exact distances are diffi-
cult to measure in most data sets, with researchers relying on distance
from each patient’s zip code centroid to each hospital. This can affect
the precision of the estimates. The current paper presents a new source
of variation that is orthogonal to variation based on distance: patients
who live near one another but are treated at different hospitals.C. Background on Prehospital Care
The key ingredient of our approach is the recognition that the locus of
treatment for emergency hospitalizations is, to a large extent, deter-
mined by prehospital factors, including ambulance transport decisions
and patient location. Among the emergency cases we consider, 61 per-
cent are brought into the hospital via ambulance. In such cases, the level
of care dispatched to the scene ðe.g., advanced life support using para-
medics vs. basic life support using emergency medical techniciansÞ may
be chosen on the basis of perceived severity ðCurka et al. 1993; Athey and
Stern 2002Þ. Critically, however, in areas served by multiple ambulance
companies, the company dispatched is usually chosen independent of
the patient characteristics that can confound the hospital comparisons
reviewed above.
Rotational assignment of competing ambulances services—as well as
direct competition between simultaneously dispatched competitors—is
increasingly common in the United States. For example, two recent
articles cite examples from North and South Carolina in which the op-
portunity for ambulance transport is broadcast to multiple companies,
and whichever arrives there first gets the business ðsee, e.g., Johnson
2001; Watson 2011Þ. Similarly, large cities such as New York, Los Ange-
les, and Chicago have adopted a hybrid approach under which private
ambulance companies work in conjunction with fire departments to
provide EMS ð Johnson 2001Þ. Another report found that of the top 10
cities with the highest population over age 65, five contracted with both
public and private ambulance carriers, while two others contracted
exclusively with private carriers ðChiang, David, andHousman 2006Þ. In a
more recent 2010 survey covering 97 areas, 40 percent reported con-
tracting with private ambulance companies and an additional 23 percent
utilized hospital-based ambulance providers ðRagone 2012Þ.
We are aware of no systematic evidence on the basis for rotational
assignment of ambulances. To understand the dispatch process, we con-This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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serving the area in our Medicare data. The survey revealed that patients
can be transported by different companies for two main reasons. First,
in communities served by multiple ambulance services, 911 systems of-
ten use software that assigns units on the basis of a rotational dispatch
mechanism; alternatively, they may position ambulances throughout
an area and dispatch whichever ambulance is closest, then reshuffle the
other available units to respond to the next call. Second, in areas with
a single ambulance company, neighboring companies provide service
when the principal ambulance units are busy under so-called mutual aid
agreements. Within a small area, then, the variation in the ambulance
dispatched is due to either rotational assignment or one of the ambu-
lance companies being engaged on another 911 call. Both sources ap-
pear plausibly exogenous with respect to the underlying health of a given
patient.
There is some existing evidence that prehospital care is an important
determinant of hospital choice because of the “preferences” of ambu-
lance companies to take patients to particular hospitals. In the South
Carolina example, the article explicitly points out that if an ambulance
company associated with a particular hospital gets to the patient first, the
patient is much more likely to be transported to that hospital.
Directly relevant to our approach is research by the New York State
Comptroller’s Office in the wake of a major change in the rotational as-
signment of private and Fire Department of the City of New York ðFDNYÞ
ambulances in New York City. Skura ð2001Þ found that patients living in
the same zip code as public Health and Hospital Corporation ðHHCÞ
hospitals were less than half as likely to be taken there when assigned a
private, nonprofit ambulance ð29 percentÞ compared to when the dis-
patch system assigned them to an FDNY ambulance ð64 percentÞ. Inmost
cases, the private ambulances were operated by nonprofit hospitals and
stationed near or even within those facilities, so they tended to take their
patients to their affiliated hospitals.4
This point is illustrated in figure 1, from Skura ð2001Þ. This figure
shows the location of three hospitals, two of them private hospitals that
operate ambulance service ðSt. Clare’s and New York HospitalÞ and one
public ðBellevue HospitalÞ. The author examined the rate at which
ambulances took patients residing in the Bellevue zip code to these
hospitals. He found that for those picked up by FDNY ambulances,
61 percent were brought to Bellevue and 39 percent were brought to the
more distant private hospitals. But for those picked up by private4 Paramedics are in contact with physicians at a local hospital at the scene. Our survey
revealed that the ambulance company will often speak to the hospital it is most familiar
with, which could lead it to be more likely to transport patients back to their usual hospital.
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FIG. 1.—New York City ambulance referral patterns. Source: Skura ð2001Þ; reprinted
with permission.
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Allambulance companies, only 25 percent were brought to Bellevue and
75 percent to the other hospitals ðfig. 1Þ. Similar results were found for
other zip codes within New York City as well.
In summary, ambulance dispatch rules appear to effectively random-
ize patients to ambulance companies. Previous case studies suggest that
these ambulances have preferences about which hospital to choose. Our
empirical strategy exploits this plausibly exogenous variation in the
hospital choice, as described below.III. Empirical Strategy
A. Ambulance Referral Patterns within Zip Code Areas
Our first approach relies on differences in ambulance referral patterns
within zip code areas. Ambulance companies have some discretion over
hospital choice, with a typical trade-off between distance and the hospi-This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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measuring returns to hospital care 181tal with the most appropriate level of care. We compare patients picked
up by ambulances with different tendencies to favor particular types of
hospitals ðcharacterized by their average Medicare spendingÞ in these
decisions. We then assess whether these different preferences lead to
meaningful differences in the type of hospital in which a patient is
treated.
We can illustrate that such “preferences” exist by essentially general-
izing the New York City example above using variation in hospital shares
across ambulance companies serving the same zip codes. Specifically,
using observed ambulance-hospital frequencies within each zip code in
our Medicare sample, we estimate a chi-square test of homogeneity. Con-
sider, for example, a zip code served by two hospitals in which we observe
emergency patients taken to hospital h1 75 percent of the time when they
are picked up by ambulance company a1 but only 33 percent of the time
when they are picked up by company a2. Since there are only two hospitals,
it follows that we would observe 25 percent of a1’s patients and 66 percent
of a2’s patients being taken to hospital h2. Given these observed propor-
tions, we can test whether there is statistical evidence that companies a1
and a2 have different patient transport patterns.
In our sample, we calculated test statistics for every zip code in our
Medicare data with at least five ambulance transports by comparing
observed ambulance-hospital cell frequencies to those expected under
the null hypothesis, which is that ambulances distribute patients across
nearby hospitals at the same rates.5 Among the 9,125 zip codes for which
we can calculate these statistics, 38 percent have test statistics with p < .1.
This provides evidence that there appear to be differences in where
patients are taken based on which ambulance company picks them up
that well exceed pure chance ðwhich would result in less than 10 percent
of zips having test statistics with p < .1Þ. This type of variation is the basis
of our first-stage estimation, which we turn to next.
To operationalize ambulance preferences, we calculate an instru-
mental variable that measures the treatment intensity of hospitals where
each ambulance company takes its patients. For patient i assigned to
ambulance aðiÞ, we calculate the average Medicare expenditure made
for hospital care among the patients in our analysis sample for each
ambulance company:65 The resulting test-statistic ðfor zip zÞ is distributed x2 with ðHz2 1Þ  ðAz2 1Þ degrees of
freedom, where Hz is the total number of hospitals treating patients from zip z, and Az is
the total number of ambulance companies transporting patients from zip z.
6 In practice, some ambulance companies serve large areas including multiple states. To
compare patients at risk of receiving the same ambulance company, we compute the instru-
ment at the company–hospital referral region level. Hospital referral regions are relatively
large areas designed to capture markets for nonemergency care. This allows us to retain
information about the ambulance company’s preferences across hospitals within and outside
the patient’s ðsmallerÞ hospital service area.
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This measure is essentially the ambulance company fixed effect in a
model of hospital costs. We exclude the given patient from this measure
to avoid a direct linkage between Z and the average spending in a given
hospital—a jackknife instrumental variables estimator ð JIVEÞ that is
more robust to weak instrument concerns when fixed effects are used to
construct an instrument ðStock, Wright, and Yogo 2002; Doyle 2007;
Kolesar et al. 2011Þ.7
We then use this measure to estimate the first-stage relationship
between average hospital spending, H, and the instrument, Z: hospital
costs associated with the ambulance assigned to patient i with principal
diagnosis dðiÞ living in zip code zðiÞ in year tðiÞ:
Hi 5 a0 1 a1ZaðiÞ 1 a2Xi 1 a3Ai 1 gdðiÞ 1 vzðiÞ 1 ltðiÞ 1 νi ; ð1Þ
where Xi is a vector of patient controls including indicators for each age,
race, sex, miles from the zip code centroid, and indicators for 15 com-
mon comorbidities; Ai represents a vector of ambulance characteristics
including the payment to the company, which provides a useful summary
of the treatment provided in the ambulance, indicators for distance trav-
eled in miles, whether the transport utilized advanced life support ðe.g.,
paramedicÞ capabilities, whether intravenous therapy was administered,
whether the transport was coded as emergency transport, and whether the
ambulance was paid through the outpatient system rather than the carrier
system.8 We cluster standard errors at the hospital service area ðHSAÞ
level, as each local market may have its own assignment rules. This choice
is relatively conservative compared to clustering at the ambulance com-
pany level instead.7 An alternative strategy would be to estimate hospital fixed effects and then correlate
those with hospital characteristics rather than estimate the effects of hospital character-
istics directly. Similarly, the current method of considering Medicare spending as a sum-
mary measure of treatment intensity could also be estimated using ambulance fixed effects
as instruments. The main limitation with these strategies is that the number of hospital
fixed effects and the number of ambulance fixed effects go to infinity with sample size. The
JIVE estimator provides a way to implement the ambulance preference approach in a way
that avoids the problems associated with weak instruments in this context as noted in the
literature cited above.
8 Claims for ambulances owned by institutional providers ðe.g., hospitalsÞ are found in
the outpatient file and represent about 10 percent of all ambulance transports within our
file. These data do not include the distance measure, and for these observations, the
distance indicators were filled with the sample mean.
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measuring returns to hospital care 183We also include a full set of fixed effects for principal diagnosis, year,
and zip code.9 This regression therefore compares individuals who live
in the same zip code but are picked up by ambulance companies with
different “preferences” across different types of hospitals ðexcluding the
patient herselfÞ. A positive coefficient of one would indicate that am-
bulance company preferences are correlated with where the patient
actually is admitted. Our main regression of interest is the relationship
between hospital spending on mortality, M, for patient i:
Mi 5 b0 1 b1Hi 1 b2Xi 1 b3Ai 1 gdðiÞ 1 vzðiÞ 1 ltðiÞ 1 ei : ð2Þ
This ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ regression parallels the previous
literature in modeling mortality of patient i who goes to hospital h as a
function of average hospital spending. Mortality can be measured at
intervals such as 30 days, 90 days, or 1 year. As noted earlier, this re-
gression suffers from the fact that patients may be selected into certain
hospitals on the basis of characteristics that affect their mortality. To
address this, we estimate the model by instrumental variables, where the
instrument is the ambulance measure discussed above. That is, we use
equation ð1Þ above as a first stage to estimate this model by instrumental
variables.B. Limitations
This empirical approach has four main limitations. The first is that
ambulance company preferences could be correlated with underlying
patient characteristics even within zip codes. For example, some am-
bulance companies could be expert at avoiding complicated cases that
are likely to die, or ambulance companies may serve particular parts of
a zip code. Our survey evidence gives us confidence that this is not the
case among the relatively severe conditions considered here. Further, we
investigate the extent to which observable patient characteristics differ
across ambulance companies. We also address this concern to some
extent in our specification checks by restricting our sample to particu-
larly homogeneous zip codes.
A second concern is that the approach interprets differences in spend-
ing and outcomes as stemming from different hospital assignment pat-
terns across ambulance companies, but ambulance companies may have
a direct impact on health. In particular, the companies provide treatment9 The principal diagnosis is the three-digit ICD-9-CM diagnosis code, as shown in App.
table A1.
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Allin the ambulance and may drive farther to reach their preferred hospital.
An innovation in this project is that we study ðand control forÞ differences
in care provided by the ambulance company, including the distance trav-
eled to the hospital, as described in detail below.
A third limitation is that results provide a local average treatment
effect ðLATEÞ for a subset of patients for whom the ambulance assign-
ment matters. For example, we are unable to estimate effects for patients
who always insist on ðand are taken toÞ high-spending hospitals or for
patients who would always be taken to the nearest hospital regardless of
ambulance company assignment. Relatedly, when interpreting instru-
mental variable results as a LATE, a monotonicity assumption is also
required. This could be violated if, for example, ambulance companies
steer particular types of patients to different hospitals. Reassuringly, all
patients considered here are relatively homogeneous: insured patients
suffering from a severe emergency. The steering of uninsured patients to
public hospitals, for example, is not a concern in this population.
Fourth, there could be concerns over sample selection. If high-
spending hospitals are more likely to admit patients, these patients could
be healthier on average. In addition, ambulance companies associated
with high-spending hospitals could affect the likelihood of survival to the
hospital, which would introduce its own sample selection bias. To begin to
address these concerns, we conduct a robustness check in which we
include all patients transported by ambulance and test whether admission
rates are associated with our instrument.C. Borders Approach
Our alternative approach compares patients along borders that define
distinct ambulance service areas. The idea is that patients could live in
the same neighborhood yet go to very different hospitals because they
reside on opposite sides of a shared border. This parallels the analysis of
Black ð1999Þ, who compared those living on either side of school district
borders to study the impact of school quality on housing prices. For this
analysis, we focus on New York State, for which we have data on exact
patient addresses coupled with a detailed service area grid we obtained
from the New York State Department of Emergency Medical Services.
Each state-certified EMS provider in New York is assigned to a terri-
tory where it is allowed to be “first due” for response via a certificate of
needprocess, subject to the terms of New York PublicHealth Law ðart. 30Þ.
These territories are typically delineated using county, city, town, village,
and fire district boundaries. Other areas may be entered when the pro-
vider is requested for mutual aid.
Using these data, we can identify census block groups inNew York State
on either side of an ambulance service area boundary. Census blockThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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measuring returns to hospital care 185groups are the smallest geographical units defined by the US Census
Bureau for which demographic information is publicly available. These
block groups have an average population of 1,300 residents. Using the
latitude and longitude coordinates of each patient’s residential address
as recorded in our hospital discharge data, we map each patient to a
unique census block group. We then identify individuals whose block
group centroid is located within a defined distance of its nearest ambu-
lance service territory border.
Specifically, we include patients residing in block groups located
within 1 mile, 2 miles, and 5 miles of an ambulance service area border.
The smaller distance criteria allow us to compare patients who live very
near to one another and are likely a better-matched comparison. The 5-
mile criterion allows us to retain more rural areas, however, as block
groups are constructed on the basis of population counts and the cen-
troid in these areas may lie outside the 1- or 2-mile restrictions.
The estimating equations parallel the earlier analysis, but now the
instrument is constructed across service areas rather than ambulance
companies. Rather than zip code fixed effects, we include matched-pair
fixed effects that allow us to compare patients who live on either side
of the same boundary. For patient i living in ambulance service area
aðiÞ, the first-stage model takes the form
Hi 5 f0 1 f1ZaðiÞ 1 f2Xi 1 gdðiÞ 1 vpðiÞ 1 ltðiÞ 1 qi ; ð3Þ
where Hi represents the average costs in the hospital where the patient
is treated, dðiÞ represents the patient’s principal diagnosis, ZaðiÞ is the
average hospital cost for patients living in the ambulance service area
where the patient resides, and vpðiÞ is a set of dummies for each matched
pair of census block groups. So this regression asks, Are patients who live
near a border but within an ambulance service area serviced by relatively
high-cost hospitals more likely to be treated at high-cost hospitals them-
selves compared to those who live close to that same border but in a
separate ambulance service area? Standard errors in these models are
clustered at the ambulance service area level.
We can then once again estimate a mortality cost model of the form
Mi 5 g0 1 g1Hi 1 g2Xi 1 gdðiÞ 1 vpðiÞ 1 ltðiÞ 1 ei ; ð4Þ
where we instrument for hospital costs using the first-stage relation-
ship in ð3Þ.
The borders approach augments the ambulance preference approach
because differences in hospital patterns within these small areas are
plausibly due to differences in ambulance dispatch patterns and not pa-
tient tastes. At the same time, there may be other factors that changeThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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mon border used to delineate ambulance service areas is the county,
and counties may differ in other factors that affect the choice of resi-
dence, such as the quality of public services.10 Our analysis will control
for differences in resident characteristics at the boundary using US Cen-
sus Summary File 3 data. Of course, differences in unobserved character-
istics of patients across a border from one another remain a concern.
In summary, we consider two different identification strategies using
two different data sets. Each has advantages and weaknesses, but taken
together they can provide insights into whether different types of hos-
pitals achieve better outcomes.IV. Data
A. Medicare Claims Data
Our national data are Medicare claims between 2002 and 2010. The use
of these data was previously authorized under a data use agreement with
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. In particular, the car-
rier file includes a 20 percent random sample of beneficiaries, and from
this file we observe the ambulance claim. We then link these claims to
inpatient claims, which include standard measures of treatment, such as
procedures performed, and up to 10 diagnosis codes. Patient charac-
teristics are also recorded, such as age, race, and sex. The claims data
also include the zip code of the beneficiary, where official correspon-
dence is sent. In principle, this could differ from the patient’s home zip
code. In addition, vital statistics data that record when a patient dies are
linked to these claims. This allows us to measure our primary outcome
measure: 1-year mortality.
In addition to these usual controls in claims data, we discovered that
the ambulance claims offer a new set of control variables. These data in-
clude detailed information on the mode and method of transport ðad-
vanced life support vs. basic life support; emergency vs. nonemergencyÞ11
and on specific prehospital interventions administered by ambulance10 Of the borders delineated by the New York EMS service file, borders that separate
adjacent cities and adjacent towns are most common ð29.2 percent and 18.7 percent,
respectivelyÞ, while 15.5 percent of the borders divide counties and towns, 13.2 percent of
the borders divide counties and fire districts, and 6.5 percent divide counties and villages.
Other types of borders ðe.g., town-village, city-county, etc.Þ eachmake up less than 5 percent
of the border sample.
11 While we study conditions and admissions that appear to be emergencies, ambulances
are reimbursed at a higher rate if they transport the patient under so-called emergency
traffic ði.e., “lights and sirens”Þ on the way to the hospital.
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measuring returns to hospital care 187personnel ðe.g., intravenous therapy and administered drugsÞ. While pre-
vious studies using Medicare data have been limited by their inability to
control for patient location ðbeyond using distance from the centroid of
the patient’s zip codeÞ, an innovation of our approach is that we also con-
trol for “loaded miles”: a billing term referring to the exact distance the
ambulance traveled to the hospital with the patient on board. Finally, our
Medicare claims also include an ambulance company identifier.12 This al-
lows us to construct empirical referral pattern measures that serve as the
basis for our analytic strategy.B. Medicare Spending
Our key treatment measure is the level of reimbursement that Medicare
pays for the hospital stay. This includes the amount paid to the hospital
under the prospective inpatient payment system ðthe DRG priceÞ plus
any outlier and graduate medical education payments. In addition, as
noted above, our hospital reimbursement measure also includes Medi-
care Part B payments that reimburse for the physician component of
patient care inside the hospital, as well as any outpatient facility pro-
vided concurrent with the inpatient stay.
In addition to our measure of reimbursement for the hospital stay, to
investigate the cost per at least 1 life-year saved, we also use the Medicare
claims to construct a measure of total Medicare spending over a 1-year
period that begins with the index admission. This measure is designed to
capture the range of services provided to each patient that are reim-
bursed by the Medicare program in the year following his or her initial
admission ðe.g., inpatient and outpatient careÞ. Because of data access
limitations, we were unable to include certain services ðe.g., drugs cov-
ered under Medicare Part DÞ in either our admission-based or 1-year
spending measure. Finally, given the skewness of the data, we transform
spending using the natural logarithm.C. New York State Data
Our other major data source is the universe of inpatient hospital dis-
charges from New York State, made available from the New York State
Department of Health through the Statewide Planning and Research
Cooperative System ðSPARCSÞ. These data include detailed information
on patient demographic characteristics, diagnoses, and treatments, as12 Medicare reimburses only for ambulance transports to a nearby facility; patients who
wish to be taken somewhere else must pay the incremental cost of transport to that facility.
There are a small number of such episodes in our data, and the results are not sensitive to
their inclusion.
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Allwell as a unique patient identifier that allows for longitudinal linking
across facilities. A unique feature of these data is an address field that
allows us to identify the exact patient residence location for 90 percent
of the discharge records in our 2000–2006 sample ðapproximately
20.6 million records for all patientsÞ. These data are matched to vital
statistics databases from the entire state of New York, enabling the
construction of our 1-year mortality outcome measure.
The SPARCS data complement our analysis in three ways. First, be-
cause the SPARCS data include a residential address for each hospital
patient, we can use narrowly defined geographic areas such as census
block groups for our analysis. These smaller areas are likely to be even
more homogeneous than the larger zip code areas. Second, these ad-
dresses allow us to match patients to narrowly defined areas located near
ambulance service area boundaries. Third, the New York data allow us to
compare patients throughout the age distribution and study patients
not insured under Medicare.
One limitation is thatMedicare reimbursement information is not avail-
able in the New York data. As a substitute, we use total hospital charges,
deflated by a hospital-specific cost-to-charge ratio ðCCRÞ published each
year by CMS, to form average hospital costs.13 Our inferences are similar
in the Medicare data when we use this alternative measure.D. Sample Construction
In both data sets, our primary sample consists of patients admitted to the
hospital through the emergency room with 29 “nondeferrable” condi-
tions for which selection into the health care system is largely unavoid-
able. Discretionary admissions see a marked decline on the weekend,
but particularly serious emergencies do not. Following Dobkin ð2003Þ
and Card, Dobkin, and Maestas ð2009Þ, diagnoses whose weekend ad-
mission rates are closest to two-sevenths reflect a lack of discretion as to
the timing of the hospital admission. Using our Medicare sample, we
chose a cutoff of all conditions with a weekend admission rate that was as
close as or closer to two-sevenths as hip fracture, a condition commonly
thought to require immediate care. Appendix table A1 shows the dis-
tribution of admissions across these diagnostic categories. These con-
ditions represent 39 percent of the hospital admissions via the emer-
gency room, 61 percent of which arrived by ambulance. The reliance on13 The CCR is noisy, however, and we followed the CMS-recommended procedure of
substituting the median CCR for the state-year when the calculated one is at the extreme
5 percent of the CCR distribution. The substitution of the median CCR for the state-year
was also used in the case of missing CCR data.
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measuring returns to hospital care 189ambulance transports allows us to focus on patients who are less likely to
decide whether or not to go to the hospital. Table A2 reports summary
statistics, and this sample is slightly older with a higher 1-year mortality
rate ð37 percentÞ compared to all Medicare patients who enter the
hospital via the emergency room ð20 percentÞ. These are relatively se-
vere health shocks, and the estimates of the effects of hospital types on
mortality apply to these types of episodes. We caution against applying
the results to more chronic conditions.
For our analysis of the Medicare data, we are unable to consider ben-
eficiaries who are part of Medicare Advantage programs, as their claims
are not available. These beneficiaries constitute 17 percent of the Medi-
care population in 2000 and 24 percent in 2010 ðKaiser Family Founda-
tion 2010, fig. 4.3Þ. We further limit the sample to patients during their
first hospitalization under the Medicare program in order to study out-
comes after an initial health shock and in an effort to exclude patients
who may have preferences for particular hospitals due to previous hos-
pitalizations. The patient’s hospital is recorded as the first hospital in
which the patient was treated even if he was subsequently transferred, as
the initial hospital is more likely to be exogenous. By necessity of the
empirical strategy, we limit the analysis to those patients who are brought
to the emergency roomby ambulance.We further remove a small number
of observations with missing zip code information, missing ambulance
company information, as well as ambulance companies, zip codes, or
hospitals with fewer than 10 observations. One concern is that our con-
trols for zip code do not well capture homogeneous areas when the zip
code is too large. We therefore restrict our sample to zip codes with an
area of less than 100 square miles. This does not meaningfully affect the
results. Finally, we restrict the sample to hospitals that are within 50 miles
of the patient’s zip code centroid. This results in a sample of 351,701
patients.
For our analysis of the New York SPARCS data, prehospital care is not
collected, so we cannot identify ambulance transports. To facilitate com-
parison of results using these data to the Medicare sample, we restrict
the analysis to patients who enter inpatient care via the emergency room
and have a principal diagnosis considered nondeferrable. Our main re-
sults will also focus on the first hospitalization in our data, as well as a
restriction to Medicare patients. We also remove a small number of ob-
servations with missing address information, patients whose residence is
located outside of New York State, and patients whose address could not
be matched to a block group. We again restrict the sample to patients
receiving care at a hospital located within 50 miles of their residential
address. This results in a sample of 142,809 patients within 1 mile of an
ambulance service area boundary, 213,968 patients within 2 miles of anThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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Allambulance service area boundary, and 281,036 patients within 5 miles of
an ambulance service area boundary.V. Ambulance Company Preference Results
A. Balance
The key underlying assumption of our approaches is that the sources of
variation in the hospital type have been purged of patient-specific factors
that affect costs or outcomes. To assess whether this is true at least along
observable dimensions, table 1 shows the balance of patient character-
istics across those whose ambulances tend to transport patients to rela-
tively high-spending or low-spending hospitals available to a zip code
area. In particular, we divide the data by quartiles of the distribution of
our instrument, ambulance-level average spending levels, relative to the
mean for the zip code to mirror the identifying variation.
The first row of the table lists the value of our instrument in each of the
quartiles, and the top quartile shows that ambulance companies’ average
hospital spending is about 20 log points higher compared to the lowest
quartile. The next two rows show that while predicted mortality using all
our covariates is nearly identical across the quartiles, actual mortality
declines across the quartiles, especially comparing the bottom quartile
and the top three. The remaining rows show that these four groups of
patients are similar in terms of their overall health and demographic
characteristics. While differences can be statistically significant given the
large sample size, they are arguably not economically significant. The
patient demographics are similar across the quartiles, as are the recorded
comorbidities. The travel distances are particularly similar, suggesting
that ambulances do not drive farther to get to hospitals that tend to spend
more. Meanwhile, the distribution of principal diagnoses is similar across
these categories ðtable A3Þ. At least in terms of observable characteristics,
our sample appears well balanced.B. First-Stage Relationship: Ambulance Company Affects Hospital Choice
Table 2 shows the first-stage results for our ambulance company pref-
erence instrument, equation ð1Þ above. We begin by estimating the
relationship between average hospital spending at the patient’s hospital
and the average hospital spending associated with the ambulance
company assigned to the patient, controlling only for year and zip code
fixed effects. There is a very strong correlation between the two, sug-
gesting that if the ambulance company tends to take other patients to
10 percent more expensive hospitals, the hospital where the patient is
taken has 1.7 higher average hospital spending, and this difference isThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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TABLE 1
Balance: Demographics and Comorbidities
1st
Quartile
2nd
Quartile
3rd
Quartile
4th
Quartile
Ambulance average logðhospital spendingÞ 8.830 8.914 8.938 9.017**
Predicted 1-year mortality .333 .332 .332 .333
1-year mortality .380 .366 .351 .362**
Patient age 81.461 81.277 81.330 81.394
Male .376 .383 .377 .379
Race:
White .888 .885 .885 .880**
Black .076 .078 .077 .080**
Other .035 .036 .037 .038**
Miles transported with patient 7.088 6.915 6.861 7.066
Ambulance:
Emergency transport .655 .673 .673 .656
Advanced life support .867 .870 .871 .860
Intravenous fluids administered .059 .057 .061 .056
Intubation performed .002 .002 .002 .002
Patient origin: home or nursing home .792 .812 .813 .784
Comorbidity:
Hypertension .184 .182 .173 .182
Stroke .022 .019 .018 .020
Cerebrovascular disease .031 .029 .028 .030
Renal failure disease .049 .048 .045 .049
Dialysis .004 .004 .004 .005
Chronis obstructive pulmonary disease .089 .087 .085 .086
Pneumonia .060 .056 .055 .057**
Diabetes .083 .080 .078 .080
Protein-calorie malnutrition .019 .016 .015 .017
Dementia .059 .050 .048 .055**
Paralysis .025 .022 .020 .023**
Peripheral vascular disease .048 .046 .044 .046
Metastatic cancer .026 .026 .025 .025
Trauma .036 .032 .030 .034**
Substance abuse .023 .024 .022 .023
Major psychiatric disorder .015 .013 .012 .014
Chronic liver disease .003 .004 .004 .004
Source.—2002–10 Medicare claims data.
Note.—N 5 351,701. Some ambulance measures have smaller sample sizes, largely
because they are not recorded in the outpatient reimbursement system. N 5 330,607 for
ambulance measures for advanced life support, IV administration, and distance traveled.
Columns correspond to quartiles based on the difference in ambulance company average
hospital spending relative to average hospital spending in the zip, mirroring our estimation
strategy. The last column reports a significance test for the difference between the first and
fourth quartile means.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
measuring returns to hospital care 191highly statistically significant. The subsequent columns add controls for
patient and ambulance characteristics. The result is remarkably robust to
these additional controls.
The first-stage coefficient yields insights into the source of variation
employed by this empirical strategy. Consider variation from mutual aidThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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TABLE 2
Ambulance Strategy: First Stage
Dependent Variable: Average
LogðHospital SpendingÞ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Ambulance average logðhospital spendingÞ .169 .168 .166 .166
ð.008Þ** ð.008Þ** ð.008Þ** ð.008Þ**
Observations 351,701 351,701 351,701 351,701
Diagnosis controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Ambulance controls No No Yes Yes
Comorbidity controls No No No Yes
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source.—2002–10 Medicare claims data.
Note.—Estimates are reported for eq. ð1Þ in the text. All models include zip code and
year fixed effects. Patient controls include indicators for year of age, race, sex, miles from
the zip code centroid, and comorbidities. Ambulance controls are listed in table 1. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the HSA level.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.
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Allagreements: when the “main” ambulance company is busy, another am-
bulance company ðeither a private ambulance possibly coming from a
hospital or an ambulance from a nearby areaÞ is called in to help. The
instrument measures the spending level of the hospitals to which that
ambulance company takes other patients, and most of these will be from
the company’s usual area, by definition. A positive first-stage coefficient
that is less than one says that these ambulances are significantly more
likely than themain ambulance company to take the patient back to their
usual hospital, but not as often as they take their usual patients:
the mutual aid area likely has other nearby hospitals in the choice set.C. Hospital Spending and Patient Mortality
Panel A of table 3 shows the results of estimating equation ð2Þ by OLS.
We find a significant negative correlation between hospital spending
and mortality. The results suggest that raising spending 10 percent ðor
$800Þ would lower 1-year mortality by 0.2 percentage points ðor about
0.5 percent of baseline mortalityÞ in our richest specification. As noted
earlier, patient selection could result in an upward or downward bias.
This may explain the sensitivity of the results to include demographic
controls; the coefficient falls by half between columns 1 and 2 and then
again in half when we control for ambulance characteristics. This sug-
gests that higher-spending hospitals treat healthier patients in terms of
age, sex, and recorded comorbidities and whose ambulance character-
istics are associated with lower mortality.This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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TABLE 3
Ambulance Strategy: 1-Year Mortality and Hospital Spending
Dependent Variable: 1-Year Mortality
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
A. OLS
Average logðhospital spendingÞ 2.069 2.034 2.018 2.020
ð.007Þ** ð.007Þ** ð.007Þ* ð.007Þ**
Outcome mean .364 .364 .364 .364
B. 2SLS
Average logðhospital spendingÞ 2.235 2.210 2.188 2.187
ð.063Þ** ð.059Þ** ð.059Þ** ð.056Þ**
Outcome mean .364 .364 .364 .364
Diagnosis controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Ambulance controls No No Yes Yes
Comorbidity controls No No No Yes
Source.—2002–10 Medicare claims data.
Note.—N 5 351,701. Estimates are reported for eq. ð2Þ in the text. All models include
zip code and year fixed effects. Patient controls include indicators for year of age, race, sex,
miles from the zip code centroid, and comorbidities. Ambulance controls are listed in
table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the HSA level.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.
measuring returns to hospital care 193Panel B reports the two-stage least squares ð2SLSÞ estimates, and the
point estimates are much larger in magnitude: a 10 percent rise in spend-
ing is associated with a 2.4 percentage point lower mortality rate, or about
6 percent of baseline mortality. Unlike the OLS results, these 2SLS re-
sults are more robust to the inclusion of controls; the estimates fall by
only 20 percent from the first to the last column and are statistically in-
distinguishable, albeit partly because of larger 2SLS standard errors.
To put the estimate in context, this result implies that a one standard
deviation increase in average hospital spending, an increase of 0.2 log
points or approximately $1,800, is associated with a 3.7 percentage point
reduction in mortality, or 10 percent of the sample mortality rate. Thus,
we find compelling evidence that higher-spending hospitals have sig-
nificantly lower patient mortality, at least for emergency admissions. We
consider the cost per life-year saved below.D. Robustness and Specification Checks
1. Sample Selection
We next explore tests designed to address our key identifying assump-
tions. One concern is that we are considering only patients who have
been admitted to the hospital and not other patients picked up by theThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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Allambulance company. If, for example, themost expensive hospitals admit
more patients who are healthier on average, such selection could bias the
results.14
To address this concern, we extend our analysis to consider every
patient picked up by an ambulance, regardless of whether or not he is
admitted. In particular, we divide all ambulance pickups into those who
are admitted, those who leave after visiting the emergency room, and
those who are brought into the hospital on “observation status.”15 Fig-
ure A1 displays the odds of each discharge status against the percen-
tiles of our ambulance instrument. For most of the range of our instru-
ment, there is no meaningful correlation between the instrument and
being admitted inpatient.16
2. Zip Code Characteristics
A related concern is zip code heterogeneity: some ambulance companies
may serve only a certain part of a zip code, and these ambulance com-
panies may disproportionately take their patients to particular hospitals.
For example, an ambulance company that serves a higher-income part of
a zip code could be more likely to take patients to high-spending hospi-
tals. In that case, comparisons of outcomes across ambulance companies
would include differences in the patients they serve. We can address this
concern to some extent in our specification checks by restricting our
sample to particularly homogeneous zip codes using the Summary File 3
issued by the US Census Bureau. By restricting our analysis to zip codes
with little within–zip code variation in demographic characteristics such
as household income and racial composition, we hope to minimize the
potential for ambulance selection within a zip code.
The results of doing so are shown in the panel A of table 4. We divide
zip codes into quartiles based on the standard deviation of income ðso a
higher value implies amore heterogeneous zip codeÞ and theHerfindahl
index for racial composition ðso a higher value implies a more homo-
geneous zip codeÞ. In both cases we find no systematic pattern of results14 A previous version of the paper reported that we did not find differences in 1-day
mortality across these hospitals, and we suggested that this provided some evidence that
patients were not particularly healthy at high-spending hospitals upon arrival. This is not
included here, however, because it is not clear if sample selection due to superior care by
certain ambulance companies would result in patients in better health upon arrival as a
result of that care, patients in worse health upon arrival because they survived the trip, or
some combination of the two. We concluded that it is not possible to use the time horizon
results to clarify this bias concern.
15 Observation stays are meant to be less than 2 days and are an increasingly common
alternative to inpatient admission ðFeng, Wright, and Mor 2012Þ.
16 There is a slight uptick in admission rates for the very highest values of our instru-
ment. When we trim the data to exclude the top percentiles, we get somewhat larger point
estimates. We also investigated whether hospital transfers affected the results but again
found a similar point estimate when we dropped patients who were transferred to another
hospital.
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TABLE 4
Ambulance Strategy: 2SLS Results for Subgroups
Dependent Variable: 1-Year Mortality
Coefficient
Standard
Error Observations
Mean
1-Year
Mortality
A. Zip code characteristics:
Income: standard deviation:
Bottom quartile 2.145 ð.104Þ 86,377 .370
2nd quartile 2.206 ð.11Þ 86,684 .364
3rd quartile 2.287 ð.106Þ** 86,056 .362
Top quartile 2.089 ð.095Þ 86,036 .360
Race Herfindahl index:
Bottom quartile 2.118
2nd quartile 2.216 ð.098Þ 86,052 .372
3rd quartile 2.407 ð.106Þ* 86,980 .365
Top quartile 2.131 ð.126Þ** 86,974 .363
B. Patient characteristics: ð.106Þ 85,145 .358
Age:
65–74 2.091 ð.098Þ 75,288 .274
75–84 2.312 ð.093Þ** 147,891 .334
85–94 2.192 ð.097Þ 114,243 .436
951 2.07 ð.324Þ 14,362 .589
Diagnosis mortality rate quartile:
Bottom quartile 2.196 ð.077Þ* 129,381 .204
2nd quartile 2.286 ð.133Þ* 80,550 .359
3rd quartile 2.409 ð.15Þ** 65,022 .393
Top quartile 2.014 ð.118Þ 76,901 .618
Diagnosis category:
Circulatory 2.331 ð.113Þ** 87,431 .372
Respiratory 2.177 ð.134Þ 74,053 .490
Digestive 2.208 ð.233Þ 25,488 .255
Injury 2.17 ð.133Þ 67,633 .239
All other 2.178 ð.102Þ 97,219 .377
C. Hospital characteristics:
Teaching 2.299 ð.117Þ* 158,872 .357
Nonteaching 2.207 ð.121Þ 140,325 .372
For profit 2.189 ð.105Þ 175,047 .368
Not for profit 2.239 ð.101Þ* 176,633 .361
High process quality 2.274 ð.132Þ* 183,385 .369
Low process quality 2.223 ð.461Þ 59,983 .351
High tech ðtop 10%Þ 2.652 ð.387Þ 50,344 .377
Not high tech 2.199 ð.073Þ** 271,486 .362
D. Ambulance characteristics:
Patient at home or nursing home 2.223 ð.085Þ* 281,577 .381
Patient not at home or nursing home 2.144 ð.067Þ* 70,130 .301
E. Instrument calculation:
Varies at ambulance company 
disease level 2.217 ð.194Þ 294,200 .365
Source.—2002–10 Medicare claims data.
Note.—Total sample N 5 351,701, though sample sizes for each subgroup set may no
add to 351,701 because of some sample loss from small zips without sufficient subgroup
sample sizes to fit zip fixed effects. Each cell represents a separate model. All model
include full controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the HSA level. Zip
code characteristic cells are for zip codes with available 2000 US Census data.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.
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Allacross types of zip codes. Indeed, in both cases it appears that the effects
are largest in zip codes that are neither the most heterogeneous nor the
most homogeneous. This suggests that ambulance company sorting to
neighborhoods within heterogeneous zip codes is not driving the main
results.
3. Heterogeneity across Patients and Hospitals
Table 4 reports further estimates across patient and hospital character-
istics. This allows us to consider whether hospital spending has hetero-
geneous treatment effects and also serves to consider the robustness of
the results. Panel B shows heterogeneity of results by patient age and
disease category. The results are not monotonic by either age or pre-
dicted mortality rate of the diagnosis. The effects are largest for the third
quartile of predicted mortality, before dropping to zero for the fourth
quartile. This top quartile is dominated by septicemia, an indication of a
serious infection anywhere in the body where there may not be returns
to higher spending. In terms of disease categories defined in table A1,
the results are particularly large for circulatory diseases and relatively
constant across the other categories.
Panel C considers different hospital characteristics. To do so, we rerun
our regressions within alternative selected sets of hospitals: teaching hos-
pitals ðas defined by the Council on Teaching HospitalsÞ versus nonteach-
ing hospitals, for-profit versus nonprofit, hospitals that are measured by
theCMS as having high process quality versus not,17 and whetherhospitals
are or are not at the leading edge of technology adoption.18 While the
standard errors are fairly large, the estimates are strikingly similar across
all these types of hospitals. The largest estimates are for hospitals that are
at the leading edge of technology adoption. This suggests that the mar-
ginal returns to spending may be higher in more technically advanced
hospitals.
Panel D considers an alternative thought experiment. Consider some-
one who suffers a health shock when he is away from home and happens
to be close to a high-spending hospital compared to a similar individual
who happens to be close to a low-spending hospital. We observe patients
who are picked up by an ambulance when they are away from home at
the time when they may be subject to this natural experiment. Unfortu-
nately, we do not observe the zip code where the patient experienced the17 This is a CMS-computed measure of best-practice compliance for heart attack
pneumonia, and heart failure patients as part of their Hospital Compare system.
18 To consider hospitals that are early adopters of new technologies, we considered al
new questions about hospital technology on the American Hospital Association annua
survey for the prior 5 years before each hospital admission. We then ranked hospitals on
the basis of their adoption of these new technologies and defined “high-tech” hospitals as
those in the top decile of this index.
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the patient as a control in our models, adding noise to the estimates.
Nonetheless, as we show in panel E of table 4, there are strong impacts
of hospital spending on mortality for both those picked up at home and
those picked up away from home. The results are stronger for those
picked up at home, but that may reflect the fact that we have a more pre-
cise measure of the risk set of potential hospitals to which they might have
been taken. The similarity of the results suggests that patients picked
up away from home, who are less likely to be able to direct their hospital
choice, have better outcomes if they are treated at higher-spending hos-
pitals.
Finally, one issue that arises with this type of instrument is that the
monotonicity assumption to interpret the results in a LATE framework
need not be satisfied. In this context, ambulance companies could be
more likely to take certain types of patients to high-spending hospitals
but less likely to take other types of patients to those hospitals. In speak-
ing with EMS technicians, this did not seem to be the case for serious
emergencies considered here. As noted above, this is an insured popula-
tion, so there are fewer concerns with regard to “dumping” uninsured
patients on other hospitals. To further investigate this issue, we calcu-
lated the instrument for each ambulance company by disease category
cell rather than at the ambulance company level. This estimation allows
ambulances to direct patients differentially by type of illness but retain
the LATE interpretation.19 Panel E of table 4 shows that the results are
similar when we allow the instrument to vary at the disease type level. It
is also reassuring that similar results are found across broad measures of
disease categories as shown earlier in the table.E. Mechanisms
The results show that when similar patients are treated at high-spending
hospitals, they are more likely to survive to 1 year. To unpack this overall
result, we investigated the sources of the overall spending differences.
First, we find similar results when we consider the number of procedures
typically performed by the hospital. This is not surprising given that
Medicare pays hospitals more when they treat patients more aggressively
through higher-paying DRGs and higher physician fees. We also con-
sidered different payment categories that sum to the overall spending
measure: payments stemming from the DRG paid to the hospital itself,
outlier payments, physician payments, and graduate medical education
payments. We find lower mortality rates at hospitals with higher physi-
cian payments and higher outlier payments, both of which are related to19 We used the 17 broad categories that make up the ICD-9-CM classifications.
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Allhigher levels of treatment intensity. DRG payments do reflect differences
in treatment intensity but also differences across diagnoses, and these
diagnosis differences are largely soaked up by the diagnosis fixed effects
in our specification. In the end, Medicare pays hospitals more when
physicians treat patients more intensively, and these higher-intensity
hospitals have lower mortality. The results of this analysis are shown in
Appendix table A4.F. Interpretation: Cost per Life-Year Saved
One way to interpret the size of the estimates is to consider the cost per ðat
leastÞ 1 year of life saved. High spending at the time of the initial health
shock may lead to higher spending over the course of that year if initial
spending is a complement to later spending ðin part because patients are
more likely to surviveÞ, or initial spending may lower costs over the course
of the year as it substitutes for care later in the year: patients may be dis-
charged healthier if they are treated in a high-spending hospital.
We first calculated 1-year spending on inpatient and outpatient claims,
including the spending on the initial episode.20 We then estimated the re-
lationship between 1-year spending and initial hospital spending anal-
ogous to the mortality models. Table 5 reports that a 10 percent increase
in initial hospital spending leads to a 6 percent increase in 1-year spend-
ing, or approximately $1,500. The earlier results showed that this also
leads to a 1.9 percentage point reduction in 1-year mortality. As a result,
the cost per ðat leastÞ 1 life-year saved is approximately $80,000.21 As a com-
parison, similar estimates of the cost per life-year have been found for
cardiac catheterization ð$62,500 in 1996 dollars by Chandra and Staiger
½2007 and $70,000 in 1987 dollars by McClellan and Newhouse ½1997Þ.
Thus, our estimates are consistent with previous literature with sizable
marginal returns to intensive medical interventions for emergency care
relative to a standard value of statistical life-year benchmarks of $100,000–
$200,000.VI. Border Results for New York State
A. Balance
In this section, we turn to the second empirical strategy, relying on
comparisons of individuals living in close proximity to but on either side
of ambulance service territory borders in New York State. Once again, we20 Note that this does not include patient spending such as spending on pharmaceu-
ticals.
21 This is calculated as expð10.1 1 0.06Þ 2 expð10.1Þ 5 $1,505 divided by 0.0187 equals
$80,213.
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22 As noted above, the cost measure uses hospital charges deflated by a CCR. Similar
results in the earlier Medicare-based analysis were found when we used a similar measure
For hospital charges, we calculate a main coefficient estimate of 20.199, with a standard
error of 0.029.
TABLE 5
1-Year Spending
Dependent Variable: Logð1-Year SpendingÞ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Average logðhospital spendingÞ .594 .569 .624 .623
ð.111Þ** ð.112Þ** ð.115Þ** ð.114Þ**
Outcome mean 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1
Diagnosis controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Ambulance controls No No Yes Yes
Comorbidity controls No No No Yes
Source.—2002–10 Medicare Part A claims data.
Note.—N 5 351,701. Estimates are reported for eq. ð2Þ in the text. All models include
zip code and year fixed effects. Patient controls include indicators for year of age, race, sex
miles from the zip code centroid, and comorbidities. Ambulance controls are listed in ta
ble 1. Standard errors in are parentheses, clustered at the HSA level.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.
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characteristics. In table 6 we divide each pair of census block groups in
New York into those on the low-cost side of an ambulance border and
those on the high-cost side.22 We find an 8–11 log point difference in
hospital cost, on average, between these two groups, depending on the
sample. The remaining rows again show relatively well-balanced com-
positions of the groups in terms of our control variables. Little differ-
ence is found for age, sex, and demographics ðsee a more detailed set of
comorbidity comparisons in table A5Þ, while the high-cost side is asso-
ciated with a larger fraction of African American patients. Also, while it is
notable that the distance from the patient’s home census block group to
the hospital is 0.25 mile shorter for patients on the high-cost side in the
1-mile sample, this difference fades away and is not seen in the sample of
patients within 5 miles of a boundary. In summary, the predicted mor-
tality rates using the observable characteristics are remarkably similar
across these groups.
Since individuals may differ if they choose to live on one side of the
boundary versus the other, we can also consider differences in char-
acteristics of the block groups in which they reside. In the final rows of
table 6, we find that block groups on adjacent sides of these borders are
similar in terms of characteristics such as income, share owner-occupied
housing, and share urban, though we find slight differences in the share
of owner-occupied housing for the 5-mile sample..
ago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE 6
Patient Characteristics across New York State Ambulance
Service Area Borders ðBlock GroupsÞ
Sample
<1 Mile to Border
<2 Miles to
Border
<5 Miles to
Border
Low-
Cost
Side
High-
Cost
Side
Low-
Cost
Side
High-
Cost
Side
Low-
Cost
Side
High-
Cost
Side
Mean area logðspendingÞ 8.658 8.763** 8.657 8.757** 8.675 8.752
Age 78.6 78.5 78.5 78.4 78.6 78.4*
<65 .060 .064 .062 .066* .062 .067**
≥65 and <70 .116 .117 .118 .120 .117 .120
≥70 and <75 .144 .144 .145 .145 .142 .144
≥75 and <80 .186 .189 .187 .188 .185 .187
≥80 and <90 .372 .364 .370 .359** .369 .359**
≥90 .122 .122 .120 .122 .125 .124
Share African American .063 .108** .069 .116** .081 .119**
Share Asian .008 .021** .011 .018** .021 .018
Share Hispanic .028 .027 .030 .028 .030 .025*
Share other race .028 .040 .029 .041* .025 .037*
Share Native American .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
Share male .383 .385 .385 .384 .383 .382
Distance traveled 3.977 3.727 4.126 3.915 3.958 4.001
Predicted mortality .235 .237 .236 .237 .236 .237
Median income 33,293 32,092 32,061 30,949 30,680 29,672
Share owner-occupied housing .866 .861 .864 .871 .856 .879**
Share urban .971 .973 .941 .940 .930 .926
Number of cross-border pairs 336 482 583
Source.—2000–2006 SPARCS inpatient data.
Note.—Areas represented are distances from census block group centroids to an am-
bulance service area boundary.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.
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AllB. Basic Results
Patients are more likely to attend a hospital located within their area.
Specifically, for patients with a hospital located in their area, 72 percent
of patients living within 1 mile of an ambulance service area border
are treated at a hospital within this same area, and this rate increases to
75 percent and 78 percent for those living within 2 and 5 miles of a
border, respectively. This is borne out in the first-stage relationship re-
ported in table 7. The point estimates range between 0.63 and 0.74, with
F - statistics that range from 12.8 to 18.1. Table 7 also reports the OLS
and 2SLS results for the relationship between 1-year mortality and hos-
pital costs. As for the national Medicare results, the New York State OLS
results are sensitive to controls; indeed, adding controls moves theThis content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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TABLE 7
New York State First Stage, OLS, and 2SLS ðBlock GroupsÞ
1 Mile 2 Miles 5 Miles
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
A. Dependent Variable: Mean Area LogðSpendingÞ
Ambulance dispatch area:
Mean area logðspendingÞ .715 .738 .671 .678 .627 .632
ð.207Þ** ð.206Þ** ð.181Þ** ð.177Þ** ð.153Þ** ð.148Þ**
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Diagnosis and comorbidity
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 142,809 142,809 213,968 213,968 281,036 281,036
Mean of dependent variable 8.700 8.700 8.701 8.701 8.715 8.715
B. Dependent Variable: 1-Year Mortality: OLS
Mean area logðspendingÞ .009 2.015 .014 2.012 .015 2.016
ð.010Þ ð.008Þ* ð.010Þ ð.007Þ ð.008Þ ð.007Þ*
2SLS
Mean area logðspendingÞ 2.046 2.054 2.038 2.047 2.040 2.047
ð.031Þ ð.023Þ* ð.028Þ ð.024Þ* ð.024Þ* ð.020Þ*
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Diagnosis and comorbidity
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 142,809 142,809 213,968 213,968 281,036 281,036
Mean of dependent variable .236 .236 .236 .236 .236 .236
Source.—2000–2006 SPARCS inpatient data.
Note.—Panel A reports estimates from eq. ð3Þ in the text, and panel B reports estimate
from eq. ð4Þ. All models include boundary fixed effects. Demographic controls include
indicators for age, race, sex, miles from the hospital to the block group centroid, and
census block group characteristics. Diagnosis controls include the patient’s three-digi
principal diagnosis code. Comorbidities included are those listed in App. table A5 aggre
gated into four categories by diagnosis type. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
at the ambulance service area level.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.
23 Themortality rate in this sample is lower than in theMedicare analysis as this sample i
composed of all nondeferrable emergency room admissions rather than nondeferrable
ambulance transports, as in the Medicare sample.
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-coefficients from an insignificant positive estimate to a significant neg-
ative estimate. These findings indicate substantial selection bias in OLS.
As with the national sample, however, the estimates increase in mag-
nitude when we use a 2SLS approach. Using the border strategy, we find
that a 10 percent increase in costs is associated with a 0.005 percentage
point reduction in mortality, or about 2 percent of the baseline mortality
rate.23 This result implies that a one standard deviation increase ins
ago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allaverage hospital costs is associated with a 2.1 percentage point reduction
in mortality, or 8.9 percent of the baseline mortality rate.24 These results
reinforce our findings from the ambulance company preference strat-
egy, as we again find compelling evidence that higher-cost hospitals have
lower mortality for emergency admissions.25
One extension that is available in New York is our ability to look at the
impacts of hospital costs on the nonelderly. To do so, we replicate our
existing strategy for the nonelderly sample, ages 18–64, and the “near
elderly,” ages 50–64 ðsee App. tables A6 and A7Þ. For both samples, we
restrict analysis to the same nondeferrable conditions analyzed in the
Medicare sample. We find similar first-stage estimates in these samples,
and the OLS results are again sensitive to controls. In contrast to the
results for the elderly, we find no statistically significant impacts on
mortality using 2SLS. As with the elderly, however, point estimates for the
2SLS results are roughly twice as large in magnitude relative to the OLS
estimates. In addition, the point estimates imply a substantial mortality
cost relationship. For both groups, a standard deviation increase in hos-
pital costs is associated with a 6–15 percent reduction in mortality com-
pared to the sample mean mortality rate, magnitudes that are mostly
within the range of the New York Medicare sample.26
Third, we explored how the results differ by disease category. Table A8
shows sizable reductions in mortality for circulatory disorders, respira-
tory disorders, and injuries, with little effect found for digestive and
other disorders. Further, when the principal diagnosis is used to con-
struct predicted mortality quartiles, the point estimates suggest similar
results across the top three quartiles.VII. Conclusions
As we move from compensating health care providers on the basis of the
quantity of care to the quality of care, it is more important than ever to24 The standard deviation of mean hospital logðcostsÞ is equal to 0.415, 0.432, and 0.447
for the 1-mile, 2-mile, and 5-mile samples, respectively. Unfortunately, we do not observe
spending over the course of the year to calculate a cost per at least 1 life-year saved.
25 We also considered an alternative way to calculate these effects via a regression dis
continuity design. Specifically, we compared the mortality rates on adjacent sides of high
spending and lower-spending service area borders using the sample of patients who are no
more than 5 miles from a service area border and who reside in an ambulance service area
with a hospital in its borders and whose closest adjacent ambulance service area also
includes a hospital. These estimates show a significant decrease in 1-year mortality as one
crosses into a higher-cost area. The magnitude of this mortality reduction relative to the
discontinuity in our hospital cost measure produces results that are comparable to the
results in table 7.
26 For the nonelderly, a one standard deviation increase in costs ðapproximately 0.42Þ is
associated with a 0.4–0.8 percentage point reduction in mortality, or 8–15 percent of the
sample mortality of 5.4 percent. Meanwhile, a standard deviation increase in costs for the
near elderly ðapproximately 0.43Þ is associated with a 0.5–0.7 percentage point reduction in
mortality, or 6–9 percent of the sample mortality of 8.2 percent.
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measuring returns to hospital care 203measure hospital performance. A key limitation is the potential for
confounding due to patient selection, even after risk adjustment. We
show that plausibly exogenous assignment of emergency patients to
ambulance companies is related to hospital choice. This need not have
been the case if, for example, ambulance companies always took patients
to the nearest hospital. Further, we show that for patients who live near
the boundary of an ambulance service area, their location relative to the
boundary matters for the hospital choice, even for patients who live very
close to those boundaries.
Our results suggest that hospital choice does matter for patient sur-
vival. When a summary measure of treatment intensity is used, a one
standard deviation increase in hospital spending is associated with a
10 percent reduction in mortality compared to the mean using both of
our estimation strategies. This implies that the cost to Medicare per ðat
least 1Þ life-year saved for these emergency patients is in the range of
$80,000. We show that these results are robust to a number of tests of our
identifying assumptions and are comparable with both identification
strategies.
While our specification and robustness checks suggest that differences
in hospital assignment drive the main result, there remain important
limitations to the empirical approach. One particular limitation is that
the results apply to patients whose ambulance assignment matters for
hospital choice: a local average treatment effect. We view the results as
particularly relevant to hospital choice decisions, however, as they apply
to cases in which there is some discretion over where a patient may be
treated. In addition, the results necessarily apply to emergency cases,
and future research that extends this analysis to the nonemergent
population would be particularly fruitful.
Finally, future work on the mechanisms that underlie these findings is
critical. It may well be that high-spending hospitals could achieve similar
mortality rates at lower costs as they become more efficient. The results
here do suggest caution when considering a reduction in Medicare
spending for patients receiving emergency care.This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 22, 2016 06:09:50 AM
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TABLE A1
Principal Diagnoses in Main AnalysisThree-Digit Principal Diagnosis038
162
197
410
431
433
434
435
482
486
507
518
530
531
532
557
558
560
599
728
780
807
808
820
823
824
959
965
20
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Category
ð1Þ4
1.001.088 on A
 and ConditionWeekend Rate
of Admission
ð2Þugust 22, 2016 0
s (http://www.jourObservations
ð3ÞSepticemia All other .265 31,206
Malignant neoplasm of trachea,
bronchus, and lung All other .269 3,728
Secondary malignant neoplasm of
respiratory and digestive systems All other .269 2,656
Acute myocardial infarction Circulatory .270 33,111
Intracerebral hemorrhage Circulatory .282 6,287
Occlusion and stenosis of
precerebral arteries Circulatory .264 3,904
Occlusion of cerebral arteries Circulatory .274 31,836
Transient cerebral ischemia Circulatory .274 12,320
Other bacterial pneumonia Respiratory .269 4,098
Pneumonia, organism unspecified Respiratory .272 41,034
Pneumonitis due to solids and liquids Respiratory .278 11,383
Other diseases of lung Respiratory .272 17,501
Diseases of esophagus Digestive .268 4,105
Gastric ulcer Digestive .265 4,533
Duodenal ulcer Digestive .280 3,175
Vascular insufficiency of intestine Digestive .279 2,603
Other and unspecified noninfectious
gastroenteritis and colitis Digestive .282 3,038
Intestinal obstruction without mention
of hernia Digestive .277 8,075
Other disorders of urethra and
urinary tract All other .265 21,748
Disorders of muscle, ligament,
and fascia All other .257 2,558
General symptoms All other .286 35,277
Fracture of ribðsÞ, sternum, larynx,
and trachea Injury .276 2,254
Fracture of pelvis Injury .264 6,056
Fracture of neck of femur Injury .267 50,790
Fracture of tibia and fibula Injury .264 2,054
Fracture of ankle Injury .266 4,358
Injury, other and unspecified Injury .257 756
Poisoning by analgesics, antipyretics,
and antirheumatics Injury .265 635
Poisoning by psychotropic agents Injury .283 622969
Source.—2002–10 Medicare claims data.
Note.—The 29 principal diagnoses were chosen as diagnoses that had a weekend
admission rate that was as close to or closer than two-sevenths as hip fracture in the full
inpatient Medicare data. Weekend admission rates reported here are those in the main
analysis sample, which is limited to ambulance transfers. Results are nearly identical when
the broader category of “general symptoms” is excluded from the analysis.6:09:50 AM
nals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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were treated more than 50 miles from the zip code of their mailing address, patients with
missing cost information, and a minimum of 10 observations in the analysis sample for
each zip code, hospital, and ambulance company.TABLE A3
Balance: Discharge Condition ICD-9 Code1st
Quartile2nd
Quartile3rd
Quartile:
n4th
QuartileSepticemia .093 .092 .082 .088
Malignant neoplasm of trachea, bronchus,
and lung .011 .011 .010 .011
Secondary malignant neoplasm of
respiratory and digestive systems .008 .008 .007 .007
Acute myocardial infarction .099 .101 .089 .088**
Intracerebral hemorrhage .019 .020 .017 .017**
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als.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
AllTABLE A3 (Continued)518
530
531
532
557
558
560
599
728
780
807
808
820
823
824
959
965
Aver
Out
Dem
Diag
Amb
Com
206
This content downloaded from 018.051.001
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and C1st
Quartile.088 on Au
onditions 2nd
Quartilegust 22, 2
(http://www3rd
Quartile016 06:09:5
.journals.u4th
QuartileOther diseases of lung .051 .052 .048 .048
Diseases of esophagus .012 .012 .011 .012
Gastric ulcer .013 .014 .012 .013
Duodenal ulcer .009 .009 .009 .009
Vascular insufficiency of intestine .008 .007 .007 .007
Other and unspecified noninfectious
gastroenteritis and colitis .008 .008 .009 .009
Intestinal obstruction without mention
of hernia .023 .022 .023 .023
Other disorders of urethra and urinary tract .062 .058 .062 .066
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and trachea .006 .007 .006 .006
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Fracture of neck of femur .144 .134 .153 .146**
Fracture of tibia and fibula .006 .006 .006 .006
Fracture of ankle .012 .012 .013 .012
Injury, other and unspecified .002 .002 .002 .002
Poisoning by analgesics, antipyretics,
and antirheumatics .002 .002 .002 .002
Poisoning by psychotropic agents .002 .002 .002 .002969
Source.—2002–10 Medicare claims data.
Note.—N 5 351,701. The last column reports a significance test for the difference
between the first and fourth quartile means.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.TABLE A4
Decomposition of SpendingDependent Variable: 1-Year MortalityInpatient
FacilityDoctor
ðCarrierÞ IME Outlier Outpatientage logðhospital spendingÞ 2.056 2.142 2.002 2.282 .022
ð.051Þ ð.040Þ** ð.001Þ ð.072Þ** ð.007Þ**come mean .364 .364 .364 .364 .364
ographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
nosis controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ulance controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
orbidity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes YesZip
Source.—2002–10 Medicare claims data.
Note.—N 5 351,701. Each cell represents a separate model analogous to those esti-
mated in table 3. Each column reports model results based on various measures of spend-
ing that, when summed across types, equal our total spending measure: total hospital aver-
age logðhospital spendingÞ for facility payments, physician reimbursement, graduate medical
education ðIMEÞ, outlier spending, and any outpatient facility use ðincluding observation
statusÞ. All models include full controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
HSA level.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.0 AM
chicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE A5
Patient Comorbidities across New York State Ambulance
Service Area Borders ðBlock GroupsÞMea
Com
A
C
Pe
C
D
C
R
Pe
M
D
D
H
R
C
M
M
A
Num
This content
All use subject to UniversitySample<1 Mile to Border207
 downloaded from 018.
 of Chicago Press Term<2 Miles to Border051.001.088 on August
s and Conditions (http:<5 Miles to BorderLow-
Cost
SideHigh-
Cost
SideLow-
Cost
SideHigh-
Cost
SideLow-
Cost
Side 22, 2016 06
//www.jourHigh-
Cost
Siden area
logðspendingÞ 8.658 8.763** 8.657 8.757** 8.675 8.752
orbidity:
cute myocardial
infarction .060 .062 .059 .062* .057 .061**
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ripheral vascular
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erebrovascular
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ancer .036 .036 .036 .036 .036 .036
oderate or severe
liver disease .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .003
etstatic cancer .031 .033* .031 .033* .031 .032
IDS .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
ber of cross-
border pairs 336 482 583Source.—2000–2006 SPARCS inpatient data.
Note.—Areas represented are distances from census block group centroids to an
ambulance service area boundary.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.:09:50 AM
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A. Dependent Variable: Mean Area LogðSpendingÞulance dispatch area:
ean hospital
logðspendingÞ .727 .713 .730 .712 .662 .644ð.150Þ** ð.151Þ** ð.154Þ** ð.150Þ** ð.139Þ** ð.137Þ**
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
nosis and comorbidity
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ervations 114,648 114,648 175,161 175,161 233,616 233,616
n of dependent
variable 8.460 8.460 8.457 8.457 8.463 8.463B. Dependent Variable: 1-Year Mortality: OLSn area logðspendingÞ .006 2.008 .010 2.005 .013 2.003
ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.003Þ** ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.003Þ2SLSn area logðspendingÞ .004 2.019 .007 2.011 .012 2.010
ð.008Þ ð.013Þ ð.011Þ ð.013Þ ð.013Þ ð.012Þcontrols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
nosis and comorbidity
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ervations 114,648 114,648 175,161 175,161 233,616 233,616
n of dependent
variable .053 .053 .054 .054 .055 .055Source.—2000–2006 SPARCS inpatient data.
Note.—Each cell represents a separate model analogous to those estimated in table 7.
All models include boundary fixed effects. Demographic controls include indicators for
age, race, sex, miles from the hospital to the block group centroid, and census block group
characteristics. Diagnosis controls include the patient’s three-digit principal diagnosis
code. Comorbidities included are those listed in table A5 aggregated into four categories
by diagnosis type. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the ambulance service
area level.
* Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.:50 AM
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characteristics. Diagnosis controls include the patient’s three-digit principal diagnosis
code. Comorbidities included are those listed in table A5 aggregated into four categories
by diagnosis type. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the ambulance service
area level.
* Significant at 5 percent.
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Respiratory 2.118** ð.041Þ 57,894 .323
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